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The Genocide Prevention Task Force’s Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policy Makers (the Albright-Cohen Report) has been touted as a comprehensive
proposal for significantly improving the United States’ response to genocide and other
mass violence in foreign regions.1 The report recommends various new initiatives,
committees and groups, procedures, and resource allocations to support this goal.
It also calls for increased attention to genocide at every level of the US government,
from the president on down. The assumption is that if our leaders and others in
government take genocide more seriously as an ongoing threat, and if effective
institutional structures, processes, and resources are put in place, these will be used to
prevent or intervene against genocide and other mass atrocities. At its most basic level,
the report seeks to change the practical details and conceptual elements of the United
States’ relationship to genocide, from what the report presents as relative indifference
to active, productive engagement.
1. The Report’s Statement of the Problem
Crucial to such an exercise, of course, is an assessment of the current relationship.
According to the report’s authors, genocide happens in unstable societies, often in post-
conflict situations or when contending forces, perhaps split along ethnic or other
identity lines, vie for power in a new or a ‘‘failed’’ state. In addition, the US government
is fully external to historical examples of genocide as presented in the report, and
to potential genocides as discussed therein. Genocide is seen as a discrete dynamic that
happens somewhere else, and the challenge is for the United States to overcome
its external positioning in order to intervene before or during the execution of a given
genocide. It might use a number of options, from diplomatic negotiation and targeted
aid to economic sanctions and military action.
According to the report, there are three main problems with the United States’
past relationship to genocide. First, the United States has often failed to recognize that
what was occurring was genocide, as in the case of Rwanda. Second, even when it has
recognized the potential for genocide or that genocide was under way, the United
States has failed to take preventative steps or to intervene—in some instances through
a lack of political will and in others because of a perceived conflict with overriding
US interests. Third, prevention and intervention efforts, when made, have typically
been inadequate or inconsistent. The challenge, then, is correctly to identify, hopefully
well before situations are critical, societies in which genocide might occur or in which it
is occurring, and to respond with diplomatic efforts, development projects, political
initiatives, military intervention, and/or other tools to prevent genocide from occurring
or to stop it once it has begun.
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2. Evaluation
Is this general appraisal of the threat of genocide in the world and of problems with
past US responses accurate? To some extent, perhaps; but it includes a number of
problematic elements.
First, it is not true that genocides occur today, or have occurred in the past, only
in fragmented, ‘‘failing’’ states. While this might have been the case in the former
Yugoslavia, it was not true in Rwanda, which had stable borders and a fixed political
structure that lent itself to a highly organized, carefully calculated, precisely
executed, and tightly controlled genocide.2 Similarly, while Sudan has seen internal
division and conflict for decades, there is every indication that the genocidal assaults
in Darfur are managed by a government solidly in control of what happens within its
borders.3 If we extend the analysis to other cases, we find, for instance, that
genocidal violence in East Timor began in the 1970s, when the Indonesian
government was undeniably stable and powerful and had such control over
the situation that it was able to use local paramilitary groups systematically as
tools of genocide.4 The Herero Genocide, the Armenian Genocide, the Ukrainian
Genocide, the Holocaust, the Guatemalan Genocide, the Cambodian Genocide,5 and
genocides of indigenous peoples in the Amazon,6 among others, were perpetrated by
fixed, established states with governments in firm control. While tensions within
states have certainly contributed to genocide, similar and worse tensions exist in
all sorts of other states without producing genocide. Indeed, historically, the
‘‘failed state’’ view of genocide at best captures one type among many. By focusing
on that particular kind of case, the Albright-Cohen Report has produced
recommendations that may well not apply to other contexts and thus cannot
engage other kinds of genocides adequately. For instance, development aid will
presumably not be a good method of intervention when the perpetrator state is
economically strong or supported by economically strong outside actors. Further,
this approach discounts precisely the kinds of genocides in which the United States
and other great powers are typically involved.
Second, and relatedly, it is not the case that the United States failed to act, in the
cases discussed in the report, because its leadership did not realize that genocide or
other mass violence was occurring. We know very well that the US government
understood that genocide was occurring in Rwanda, in the former Yugoslavia, and in
other contexts.7 Some cases have dragged on genocidally for years, as in Sudan, even
after recognition by the US government that genocide was occurring.8 Given this fact,
the report’s emphasis on early warning seems designed to obscure the fact that
US leadership—including Madeleine Albright herself, during the Rwandan
Genocide9—has consistently failed to intervene as a result of conscious, explicit
policy decisions made with full awareness of the situations in question and of the
consequences of inaction.
Third, the implicit assumption that the United States has been or will be
disconnected from past and future genocides is false. The United States has, in fact,
been intimately involved in a number of genocides, even in recent years. This not only
means that, since key decision makers in the US government have been well aware of
cases such as East Timor and Guatemala while they were unfolding—because we were
complicit in them—the concern about early warning is irrelevant, but also calls into
question a further element of the report’s framework. Albright and Cohen’s claim, in
their Foreword, that genocide is ‘‘a crime that threatens not only our [US] values, but
our national interests’’ (ix)—a view repeatedly echoed in the report—is, historically,
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simply not true. For instance, the United States provided weapons, logistical support,
diplomatic cover, political support, and/or other support for Indonesia’s genocide
of East Timorese,10 Guatemala’s genocide of Mayans,11 the 1965 Indonesian genocide
of so-called Communists,12 Saddam Hussein’s genocide of Kurds,13 and probably the
Bangladesh Genocide, to name just a few cases. If the focus is broadened to mass
atrocity as well, we must include substantial military and diplomatic support for
Turkey’s mass human-rights violations against Kurds; Israel’s mass human-rights
violations against Palestinians; the direct US involvement in the assassination of the
democratically elected Salvador Allende in Chile on 11 September 1973, the
installation in his place of mass human-rights abuser Augusto Pinochet, and
subsequent support for Pinochet’s regime; support for El Salvador’s brutal government
in the 1980s; support for the Shah of Iran; and many others. In short, it has been
consistent US policy to support genocide and related mass violence against innocent
targets whenever such support has been perceived to serve some kind of (usually
military or corporate) US interest.
The United States has even retroactively involved itself in genocide on the side of
the perpetrator state. While during the Armenian Genocide the record of US
diplomats, led by Henry Morgenthau and including such figures as Leslie Davis and
Jesse B. Jackson, was exemplary,14 it is striking that the then secretary of state,
Robert Lansing, and others maintained a pro-Turkish policy15 that has been embedded
in the State Department and in US policy ever since. The US government, with the
exception of some Congressional leaders, has strongly supported the Turkish
government’s denial of the Armenian Genocide. It is noteworthy that both Albright
and Cohen have actively attempted to prevent US recognition of the Armenian
Genocide,16 a fact that calls into question their credibility on genocide issues generally.
Reflecting their activities against recognition of the Armenian Genocide is the fact that
the report contains no explicit reference to an ‘‘Armenian Genocide’’: what happened to
Armenians is mentioned in only three places in the report, where it is characterized as
a ‘‘mass atrocity’’ (19, 94), ‘‘forced exile’’ (19), and an ‘‘atrocity’’ (56); the report thus
specifically avoids use of the technically correct and politically and ethically important
term ‘‘genocide’’ for this heavily denied case. Rather than taking a stand against
denial, with all that that would do for prevention of future genocides (helping
to change the climate of denial to make it less likely that denial of ongoing cases will
be accepted), the report itself, in this dimension, becomes a further obstacle to an
appropriate US response to genocide.
The report consistently ignores the foregoing issues, instead presenting the United
States’ relationship to genocide as one of mistaken inaction and unfortunate
indifference. For instance, the US ‘‘failure’’ in Rwanda, according to the report, was
‘‘that the attention of senior policy makers was distracted from Rwanda in 1994 by
other crises unfolding at the same time in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti’’ (2). There is no
mention that nothing substantive was done about Bosnia, either; moreover, this
statement completely disregards the ample evidence that US leaders intentionally
denied that the situation in Rwanda was a genocide, despite their knowledge to the
contrary in the early stages, in order to avoid intervening.17 The United States has
been far from indifferent to genocide. At a number of points, the authors, while
pointing out that the United States has not been perfect, claim that on balance, with
respect to genocide, the United States has done more good things than bad. This is
simply not the case. Kenya seems the main ‘‘good case’’ cited, and what is presented as
successful US intervention is mentioned many times (2, 20, 21, 45, 62, 68, 71, 94),
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almost as if repeated mention of this one situation will somehow multiply into a whole
history of positive US actions that, in fact, have not taken place. To support the claim
that the United States has a good track record of prevention and intervention, the
report states that
an honest accounting shows that the United States has much to its credit in these
matters—from mobilization for total war to defeat the genocidal Nazi regime, to lesser
military campaigns aimed at halting mass atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, to the
enforcement of a no-fly zone in Iraq to protect that country’s Kurdish population from
Saddam Hussein’s regime. In addition to military measures, the United States has been
active diplomatically, for example in Kenya in early 2008, to prevent situations posing
the danger of mass atrocities from escalating. (94)
This is followed by a caveat:
While the United States has much to its credit, candor demands acknowledgment that
it has not always lived up to the aspirations codified in the Genocide Convention, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Charter—or the principles of our
own Declaration of Independence, which insists that all people are endowed first of all
with an inalienable right to live. Too often, the United States has failed to act in a
timely fashion and has engaged in counterproductive finger-pointing and denial. (94)
These statements skew the reality of the particular cases (surely no one believes that
World War II was actually fought to stop the Holocaust, especially given that the Allies
would not spare the resources or make the effort to bomb railways used to transport
victims to death camps) and understate and obscure the problem dramatically. The
report becomes outright hypocritical when, following these statements, we discover
that other countries do in fact ‘‘turn a blind eye to atrocities,’’ sometimes as ‘‘a direct
result of their own complicity’’ (95): this obvious point is never made about the United
States, yet is considered valid for other societies.
It should be noted that, where genocide and other mass violence do result from
destabilization of a society, the United States has frequently been involved in this
destabilization as well. Perhaps the most telling case is the bombing of Cambodia,
which (though this point is still debated) by many accounts played a role in the later
genocide.18
3. The Fundamental Problem
Yet even the foregoing is only the tip of the iceberg of the US relationship to genocide.
To understand that relationship, it is crucial to recognize that the United States itself
was founded territorially on genocide of Native Americans, as a matter of long-
standing, centralized state policy as well as of attitudes and actions within civil society
and popular culture. While a comprehensive account of US genocidal action against
Native Americans and its embedding in our popular and political culture and
institutions is beyond the scope of this commentary, certain elements pointing to a
general account can be conveyed.
First, the extermination of Native Americans through direct killing, destruction of
food supplies, forced deportation under deadly conditions, and other means—all of
which fit the definition of genocide given in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—were government policy from the
Revolutionary War at least until 1890. This was true of federal as well as state and
local governments—for instance, through the infamous state ‘‘scalp bounties’’ used to
pay private contractors to exterminate Native Americans deemed ‘‘hostile,’’ which
ended up supporting the murder of many ‘‘pacified’’ Native Americans. While not every
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Native American group was subjected to genocide, the overall effect of US policies
and of governmental and non-governmental actions organized around the ideology of
Manifest Destiny and its predecessor forms was the genocidal destruction of Native
American societies. On the order of 10 million Native Americans resided in what would
become the continental United States prior to European contact; only 237,000 lived on
that territory by 1900. Even recognizing that a portion of the destruction occurred
before the formation of the United States as an independent nation, the role of the
United States was significant and generally determinative.
Second, even after the end of direct genocide with the Massacre of Wounded Knee
in 1890, genocidal policies continued in the twentieth century against the residual
indigenous population (largely captive on reservations by this point), most notably the
brutal forced assimilation of Native American children in Christian boarding schools
and the forced sterilization of Native American women. Where Native American
political organizing has threatened the land and other gains of genocide, the US
government has sponsored or countenanced direct violence, for instance with the
assassinations of more than 100 American Indian Movement leaders and their family
members in the early 1970s.19
What is particularly striking and American about this genocidal process is
the extent to which it was decentralized and dependent on individual initiative within
an overall state-sponsored framework. Groups of settlers as private citizens,
paramilitary groups, and other groupings were important elements in the destruction
of Native Americans. Thus, Native American genocides were not simply top-down
affairs but involved a willing broader US population. The evidence of widespread
approval for genocide is ample, as for instance inWizard of Oz author L. Frank Baum’s
comments in the Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer on 20 December 1890, following Wounded
Knee:
The nobility of the Redskin is extinguished . . .The Whites, by law of conquest, by
justice of civilization, are masters of the American continent, and the best safety of
the frontier settlements will be secured by the total annihilation of the few
remaining Indians. Why not annihilation? Their glory has fled, their spirit broken,
their manhood effaced; better that they should die than live the miserable wretches
they are.20
What does all of this mean? It means that genocide is at the core and foundation of
American history and national formation, and that its influence on policy decisions
today cannot be avoided. If most of us, in essence, ‘‘forget’’ the past treatment of Native
Americans, that treatment is part of the organizational memory of US political,
military, and cultural policies, practices, and institutions. Until this relationship to
genocide is changed, our future engagements with genocide will be informed and
compromised by it. Just as our perpetration of genocide against Native Americans has
grounded our support for the other genocides with US complicity discussed above—
particularly where the victims have been indigenous Americans, as in the case of
Guatemala—the cumulative effect of this bedrock and what we have built on it will
continue to provide powerful impetus for US indifference to and complicity in genocide
around the globe. And, it is little wonder that so many in the US government,
including the State Department, see nothing wrong with the Armenian Genocide and
fully support Turkey in its denial: the role of the Armenian Genocide in the formation
of the Turkish Republic is in some ways analogous to that of Native American
genocides in the formation of the post-Revolutionary United States through territorial
expansion. It is little wonder we have countenanced genocides around the globe.
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The Albright-Cohen Report, in failing to engage this central issue of US identity,
cannot offer meaningful recommendations on how to motivate an appropriate
US response to genocide, no matter how many committees, administrative shifts,
trainings, and resource allocations it proposes. The problem is not a technical
challenge of how to develop successful mechanisms of prevention and intervention
against genocide, nor of how to energize US governmental and popular sentiment to
care about genocide as an issue to which we are otherwise indifferent. The problem is
how to change the deep relationship between the United States and genocide.
4. Diplomatic, Military, and Other Intervention
The authors of the report recognize that there will be suspicion of US diplomatic,
military, and aid-oriented attempts to prevent or stop genocide. However, they fail to
engage this concern in a serious way. For instance, while they recognize that some
such suspicion might come from the fallout of the Iraq War, they consider it mainly
‘‘a by-product of the U.S. position as the world’s leading military power’’ and ‘‘suspicion
of U.S. ambitions to transform other societies through such long-standing policies
as democracy promotion’’ (95–96). Clearly, the problem is not simply the fact that
the United States has great military power but, rather, how we have used that power.
In fact, we have used military power aggressively from the 1836 Mexican War through
the Spanish-American War and the Vietnam War; we have used military intervention
in many Latin American countries solely to promote our own interests from the early
twentieth century on, including some of the cases already mentioned above; and so on.
The suspicion of US militarism is valid, however much, from the vantage point of our
own self-interest and national self-promotion, we might see the use of military violence
to secure the desired goals of US political and economic elites as legitimate. Similarly,
the idea of ‘‘democracy promotion,’’ which the authors of the Albright-Cohen Report
uncritically accept at face value, is deeply problematic, as we have supported
many repressive regimes around the world in the name of ‘‘freedom’’21 and even
claimed some non-democratic states, such as the contemporary Turkish Republic, as
democracies because of their utility in advancing our interests. US-led international
development efforts, most notably by the US Agency for International Development,
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, also have questionable
histories. They have for years been widely criticized for imposing on countries
desperate for help after being devastated by colonial exploitation, and in the face of the
new inequalities of globalization, conditions that have destabilized their societies and
driven local populations into abject poverty, conditions that have mainly served the
interests of US-based multinational corporations.
This problem is compounded by the continued operation of such institutions and
initiatives as the School of the Americas, which has been shown to train foreign
soldiers and others in the abuse of human rights and many of whose graduates have
been identified as major human-rights abusers in their home countries in Latin
America.22 It is difficult to understand how the United States can promote human
rights and try to prevent genocide on the one hand while clearly promoting abuse of
human rights and systematic state violence on the other.
In the absence of a serious engagement of these issues and changes in the political
culture and policies that have produced them, US intervention efforts—even those that
are, in the moment, well-intentioned—will inevitably be identified with this broader,
darker history and all too easily co-opted for continuation of that history.
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5. A Key Omission
In the 100þ pages of the report, ‘‘rape’’ and ‘‘sexual violence’’ are mentioned a total of
three times (xvi, xx, 49). Yet, as a growing literature has shown, violence against
women is very often a central component in genocide and related mass violence.
In a recent paper, in fact, I argued that sexual violence against women has historically
been a key motivating factor for genocide.23 What is more, gender violence as an
element of genocide reflects deep structural features that are shared broadly across
societies. If gender violence is a core component of genocide—the Armenian, Rwandan,
and Bosnian cases are particularly well-documented in this respect—then prevention
of genocide requires engaging the foundations of gender violence, which themselves go
beyond specific features of a given society. At the very least, the report should include
detailed analysis of this issue and recommendations on how to deal with this aspect of
genocide and its likely causal role. Instead, not a single recommendation in the report
addresses this central issue.
6. Alternative Recommendations
I have asserted above that the Albright-Cohen Report sidesteps or omits entirely the
core problems the United States faces in preventing and intervening against genocide
globally. My main objections are these:
(1) The report mistakes a subset of genocides (‘‘failed state’’ genocides) for the
form of all genocides; even if its recommendations can improve the response to
this form, they might well not address other forms.
(2) The report fails to conceive accurately the true relationship of the United
States to genocide.
(3) The report fails to take seriously the active abuse of what it proposes as key
methods of genocide prevention and intervention.
The first problem could be addressed in part through a more comprehensive
approach to the various historical cases of genocide and a better use of the ample
scholarly literature on the range of forms it takes. However, the particular view of
genocide advanced in the report functions ideologically to prevent the raising of
uncomfortable questions about US foreign and domestic policy: it maintains genocide
as something distant and external, something particular to unstable postcolonial
states in Africa, the odd aberrational European ‘‘failed state’’, Asia, and so on. Thus,
the problem is not simply an academic one, and its correction requires engagement
with problem 2. For problems 2 and 3, I propose the following as prerequisites to any
further policy recommendations.
" Recommendation 1: An independent government office should be created to
evaluate all significant diplomatic, military, and related policies, actions,
alliances, foreign aid, foreign weapons and other resource distributions, and so
on, to determine their potential impact with respect to genocide: What are the
potential long-term consequences, and how might these contribute to increased
risk of genocide or other mass violence? How might a policy or action decrease
the potential for genocide? What risks and uncertainties are involved? What
can be done, and how difficult (expensive, complex, dangerous, etc.) will it be to
do if the policy or action, once implemented, begins to increase the risk of
genocide or other mass violence? To be effective, these evaluations must be
subject to public scrutiny, where state secrets are not sufficient to outbalance
the interest in good decision making, and to Congressional oversight.
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" Recommendation 2: Such institutions as the School of the Americas/WHINSEC
should be closed, both to decrease the number of trained human-rights abusers
who are potential perpetrators of mass violence worldwide and to increase the
credibility of future US prevention and intervention efforts.
" Recommendation 3: Through a comprehensive education initiative and policy
modifications, US government institutions that promote genocide and other
mass violence or hinder other governmental prevention and intervention efforts
should be changed. For instance, US State Department personnel working with
Turkey are often trained to deny the Armenian Genocide—for example, by
attending workshops run by a prominent academic denier of the Armenian
Genocide.24 Not only is inculcation of this falsification of history detrimental to
Armenians, it also—from the perspective of a pragmatic politics of US
interests—actually impedes the reality-based relationship with Turkey that is
crucial to negotiating the complex dynamics of the ever-changing Middle East.
What is more, this training fosters in the State Department an institutional
commitment to genocide denial through which other regions might be
interpreted, as well as making effective denial strategies and arguments readily
available to those who wish to cover up other cases. This conceptual framework
might well have played a role in the US government’s disastrous denialist
response to the Rwandan Genocide, for example. If the US government is to
be committed to genocide prevention and intervention, ending denialist policies
in its various institutions is crucial.
" Recommendation 4: The issue of sexual violence against women as tool of and
motive for genocide must be given full weight and must be integrated explicitly
into all US genocide-prevention and intervention efforts. Studies should be done
to assess the correlation between sexual violence against women and increased
risk of genocide.
" Recommendation 5: The US government, presumably through the Congress,
should convene a wide-reaching and comprehensive US Genocide Truth and
Responsibility Commission (USGTRC) to explore, through public testimony and
documentation, the full history and implications of the United States’
involvement with genocide. In addition to a thorough accounting of US
genocidal participation, the USGTRC should promote an understanding of the
role of genocide in the territorial and identity formation of the United States.
The commission should also open up space for consideration of how
contemporary US citizens can take responsibility for this history, in terms of
relations with victim groups and of changes in national culture, political
institutions and practices, foreign policy, and so forth.
Short of taking these steps, it is difficult to see how the United States can
meaningfully increase its effectiveness in preventing and intervening against
genocide. While the Albright-Cohen proposals might perhaps enable better interven-
tion against a case here or there, they will not improve the overall US engagement
with genocide and other mass violence in the vast majority of cases—and might in fact
provide better cover for US complicity in or perpetration of future genocides.
Notes
1. Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, chairs, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint
for U.S. Policymakers (Washington, DC: Genocide Prevention Task Force, 2008),
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:2 August 2009
208
http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/report.html (accessed 12 June 2009), xxi.
Subsequent references appear parenthetically in the text.
2. See, e.g., Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 1999), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/ (accessed
15 June 2009); Samantha Power, ‘‘A Problem from Hell’’: America and the Age of Genocide
(New York: Basic Books, 2002); ‘‘The Triumph of Evil,’’ Frontline (Boston: PBS/WGBH,
1999).
3. Even the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations Secretary-General (Geneva: United Nations, 2005), which concluded that genocide
was not occurring in Sudan, recognizes that ‘‘government forces and militias conducted
indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances,
destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced
displacement, throughout Darfur . . . on a widespread and systematic basis’’ (3). The report
also details the close links between the government and Janjaweed militias. The Sudanese
government has supplied weapons and other support, including salaries for militia
members, and in many cases has directly ordered Janjaweed violence (34).
4. See, e.g., Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise (The Real Story)
(Monroe, ME: Odonian Press, 1996).
5. On each of these cases, see, e.g., relevant entries in Israel W. Charny, ed., Encyclopedia
of Genocide, vols. 1–2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999).
6. See Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon—
Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
Though not specifically a work of genocide scholarship, this book highlights the
coordination of state governments with a key corporate actor and evangelical organization
in the destruction of indigenous groups in the Amazon region.
7. See Power, ‘‘A Problem from Hell.’’
8. Jim VandeHei, ‘‘In Break with U.N., Bush Calls Sudan Killings Genocide,’’
Washington Post, 2 June 2005, A19. The pronouncement was made by President George
W. Bush in 2005, but to date the United States has taken no substantive action to stop
this genocide.
9. See Samantha Power, ‘‘Bystanders to Genocide,’’ Atlantic Monthly, September 2001,
84–108.
10. Jardine, East Timor.
11. See, e.g., Global Exchange, ‘‘Guatemala: A Brief History,’’ http://www.globalexchange.org/
countries/americas/guatemala/history.html (accessed 15 June 2009); and ‘‘Conclusions’’ in
Guatemala—The Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission of Historical Clarification
(commissioned by the United Nations), http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/
conc1.html (accessed 15 June 2009), paras. 13–14 (‘‘The Cold War, National Security
Doctrine and the Role of the United States’’).
12. See Charny, Encyclopedia of Genocide.
13. See Power, ‘‘A Problem from Hell.’’
14. For example, see their reports on the Armenian Genocide as it occurred, in Ara Sarafian,
comp., United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917 (Princeton,
NJ: Gomidas, 2004).
15. Simon Payaslian, ‘‘The United States Response to the Armenian Genocide,’’ in Looking
Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide, ed. Richard G.
Hovannisian, 51–79 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003).
16. For examples of their long-time denialist activities see Emil Sanamyan and Nareg
Seferian, ‘‘U.S. Told to Give Higher Priority to Genocide Prevention: Albright-Cohen
Report Sidesteps Armenian-American Concerns,’’ Armenian Reporter, 11 December 2008,
http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2008-12-11-u-s-told-to-give-higher-priority-to-genocide-
prevention (accessed 15 June 2009). One of Albright’s most striking acts was to sign a
25 September 2007 letter from eight former US secretaries of state to Nancy Pelosi,
From Realpolitik Fantasy to Realist Ethics
209
speaker of the US House of Representatives, strongly urging her to prevent House
Resolution 106, recognizing the Armenian Genocide, from making it to the floor of the
House for a vote. See ‘‘Turkey Enlists Former U.S. Secretaries of State,’’ The Armenian
Weekly, 29 September 2007, http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly/fpg09290702.htm
(accessed 15 June 2009).
17. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; Power, ‘‘A Problem from Hell’’; ‘‘ The Triumph
of Evil.’’
18. See, e.g., Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, ‘‘Bombs over Cambodia,’’ The Walrus, October
2006, 62–69, http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2006.10-history-bombing-cambodia/
(accessed 15 June 2009).
19. This analysis is drawn from the comprehensive and extremely well documented and
well argued account of US genocidal acts against Native Americans in Ward Churchill,
A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present
(San Francisco: City Lights, 1998).
20. Quoted ibid., 244–45.
21. There are many such examples, unfortunately. Obvious ones include the Shah of Iran,
Anastasio Samoza in Nicaragua, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and Suharto in
Indonesia.
22. Because of the bad reputation it had developed, in 2001 the School of the Americas was
renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), though
its mission and approach remain the same. For information on the School of the Americas/
WHINSEC’s devastating impact on human rights in various Latin American countries,
see the extensive documentation and analysis at School of the Americas Watch,
http://www.soaw.org (accessed 15 June 2009).
23. Henry C. Theriault, ‘‘Rape as a Tool of Genocide or Genocide as a Tool of Rape?’’
(paper presented at the 8th Biennial Conference of the International Association of
Genocide Scholars, Arlington, VA, 8 June 2009).
24. Namely Heath Lowry, Ataturk Professor of Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies at
Princeton University: http://www.princeton.edu/#nes/faculty_lowry.html (accessed 16
June 2009). Lowry is a well-known denier of the Armenian Genocide whose direct link
to and proxy actions for the Turkish Embassy to the United States were documented and
exposed in Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton, ‘‘Professional Ethics
and the Denial of the Armenian Genocide,’’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 9 (1995): 1–22.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:2 August 2009
210
